

# ***APPENDICES***



# ***APPENDIX A***

# ***NFIRS REPORT***



<b>A</b> FDID * 09107 State * MA Incident Date * MM 12 DD 14 YYYY 2007 Station 1 Incident Number * 07-0004208 Exposure * 000		<input type="checkbox"/> Delete <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change <input type="checkbox"/> No Activity	NFIRS -1 Basic
<b>B Location*</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Check this box to indicate that the address for this incident is provided on the Wildland Fire Module in Section 3 "Alternative Location Specification". Use only for Wildland fires. Census Tract 2215 - 01			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Street address <input type="checkbox"/> Intersection <input type="checkbox"/> In front of <input type="checkbox"/> Rear of <input type="checkbox"/> Adjacent to <input type="checkbox"/> Directions			
Number/Milepost 80 Prefix Middle Street or Highway ST Street Type Suffix City Gloucester State MA Zip Code 01930 Cross street or directions, as applicable			
<b>C Incident Type *</b> 111 Building fire Incident Type		<b>E1 Date &amp; Times</b> Midnight is 0000 Check boxes if dates are the same as Alarm Date. Alarm * 12 14 2007 23:46:52 ARRIVAL required, unless canceled or did not arrive <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Arrival * 12 14 2007 23:49:00 CONTROLLED Optional, except for wildland fires <input type="checkbox"/> Controlled LAST UNIT CLEARED, required except for wildland fires <input type="checkbox"/> Last Unit Cleared 12 19 2007 23:49:00	
<b>D Aid Given or Received*</b> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Mutual aid received 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Automatic aid recvd. 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Mutual aid given 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Automatic aid given 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Other aid given N <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None		<b>E2 Shift &amp; Alarms</b> Local Option 2 08 HQ Shift or Alarms District Platoon <b>E3 Special Studies</b> Local Option Special Study ID# Special Study Value	
<b>F Actions Taken *</b> 11 Extinguishment by fire Primary Action Taken (1) Additional Action Taken (2) Additional Action Taken (3)		<b>G1 Resources *</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Check this box and skip this section if an Apparatus or Personnel form is used. Apparatus Personnel Suppression 0013 0060 EMS Other <input type="checkbox"/> Check box if resource counts include aid received resources.	
<b>G2 Estimated Dollar Losses &amp; Values</b> LOSSES: Required for all fires if known. Optional for non fires. None Property \$ 000,000 Contents \$ 000,000 PRE-INCIDENT VALUE: Optional Property \$ 000,000 Contents \$ 000,000			
<b>Completed Modules</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fire-2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Structure-3 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Civil Fire Cas.-4 <input type="checkbox"/> Fire Serv. Cas.-5 <input type="checkbox"/> EMS-6 <input type="checkbox"/> HazMat-7 <input type="checkbox"/> Wildland Fire-8 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Apparatus-9 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Personnel-10 <input type="checkbox"/> Arson-11		<b>H1* Casualties</b> None Deaths Injuries Fire Service Civilian 001 <b>H2 Detector</b> Required for Confined Fires. 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Detector alerted occupants 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Detector did not alert them U <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown	
<b>H3 Hazardous Materials Release</b> N <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Natural Gas: slow leak, no evacuation or HazMat actions 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Propane gas: 421 lb. tank (as is home BBQ grill) 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Gasoline: vehicle fuel tank or portable container 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Kerosene: fuel burning equipment or portable storage 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Diesel fuel/fuel oil: vehicle fuel tank or portable 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Household solvents: home/office spill, cleanup only 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Motor oil: from engine or portable container 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Paint: zero paint cans totaling < 35 gallons 0 <input type="checkbox"/> Other: special HazMat actions required or spill > 55gal., Please complete the HazMat form		<b>I Mixed Use Property</b> NN <input type="checkbox"/> Not Mixed 10 <input type="checkbox"/> Assembly use 20 <input type="checkbox"/> Education use 33 <input type="checkbox"/> Medical use 40 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Residential use 51 <input type="checkbox"/> Row of stores 53 <input type="checkbox"/> Enclosed mall 58 <input type="checkbox"/> Bus. & Residential 59 <input type="checkbox"/> Office use 60 <input type="checkbox"/> Industrial use 63 <input type="checkbox"/> Military use 65 <input type="checkbox"/> Farm use 00 <input type="checkbox"/> Other mixed use	
<b>J Property Use* Structures</b> 131 <input type="checkbox"/> Church, place of worship 161 <input type="checkbox"/> Restaurant or cafeteria 162 <input type="checkbox"/> Bar/Tavern or nightclub 213 <input type="checkbox"/> Elementary school or kindergarten 215 <input type="checkbox"/> High school or junior high 241 <input type="checkbox"/> College, adult education 311 <input type="checkbox"/> Care facility for the aged 331 <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital Outside 124 <input type="checkbox"/> Playground or park 655 <input type="checkbox"/> Crops or orchard 669 <input type="checkbox"/> Forest (timberland) 807 <input type="checkbox"/> Outdoor storage area 919 <input type="checkbox"/> Dump or sanitary landfill 931 <input type="checkbox"/> Open land or field			
341 <input type="checkbox"/> Clinic, clinic type infirmary 342 <input type="checkbox"/> Doctor/dentist office 361 <input type="checkbox"/> Prison or jail, not juvenile 419 <input type="checkbox"/> 1-or 2-family dwelling 429 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Multi-family dwelling 439 <input type="checkbox"/> Rooming/boarding house 449 <input type="checkbox"/> Commercial hotel or motel 459 <input type="checkbox"/> Residential, board and care 464 <input type="checkbox"/> Dormitory/barracks 519 <input type="checkbox"/> Food and beverage sales 936 <input type="checkbox"/> Vacant lot 938 <input type="checkbox"/> Graded/care for plot of land 946 <input type="checkbox"/> Lake, river, stream 951 <input type="checkbox"/> Railroad right of way 960 <input type="checkbox"/> Other street 961 <input type="checkbox"/> Highway/divided highway 962 <input type="checkbox"/> Residential street/driveway			
539 <input type="checkbox"/> Household goods, sales, repairs 579 <input type="checkbox"/> Motor vehicle/boat sales/repair 571 <input type="checkbox"/> Gas or service station 599 <input type="checkbox"/> Business office 615 <input type="checkbox"/> Electric generating plant 629 <input type="checkbox"/> Laboratory/science lab 700 <input type="checkbox"/> Manufacturing plant 819 <input type="checkbox"/> Livestock/poultry storage (barn) 882 <input type="checkbox"/> Non-residential parking garage 891 <input type="checkbox"/> Warehouse 981 <input type="checkbox"/> Construction site 984 <input type="checkbox"/> Industrial plant yard Lookup and enter a Property Use code only if you have NOT checked a Property Use box: Property Use 429 Multifamily dwelling NFIRS-1 Revision 03/11/99			



**K1 Person/Entity Involved**

Local Option \_\_\_\_\_ Business name (if applicable) \_\_\_\_\_ Area Code \_\_\_\_\_ Phone Number \_\_\_\_\_

Check This Box if same address as incident location. Then skip the three duplicate address lines.

Mr., Ms., Mrs. First Name Ann MI \_\_\_\_\_ Last Name Burton Suffix \_\_\_\_\_

Number \_\_\_\_\_ Prefix \_\_\_\_\_ Street or Highway \_\_\_\_\_ Street Type \_\_\_\_\_ Suffix \_\_\_\_\_

Post Office Box \_\_\_\_\_ Apt./Suite/Room \_\_\_\_\_ City Gloucester

State MA Zip Code 01930

More people involved? Check this box and attach Supplemental Forms (NFIRS-1S) as necessary

**K2 Owner**  Same as person involved? Then check this box and skip the rest of this section.

Local Option \_\_\_\_\_ Business name (if applicable) \_\_\_\_\_ Area Code \_\_\_\_\_ Phone Number \_\_\_\_\_

Check this box if same address as incident location. Then skip the three duplicate address lines.

Mr., Ms., Mrs. First Name \_\_\_\_\_ MI \_\_\_\_\_ Last Name \_\_\_\_\_ Suffix \_\_\_\_\_

Number \_\_\_\_\_ Prefix \_\_\_\_\_ Street or Highway \_\_\_\_\_ Street Type \_\_\_\_\_ Suffix \_\_\_\_\_

Post Office Box \_\_\_\_\_ Apt./Suite/Room \_\_\_\_\_ City \_\_\_\_\_

State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip Code \_\_\_\_\_

**L Remarks**

Local Option \_\_\_\_\_

Received calls for activated fire alarms at 80 Middle St., the Lorraine Apartments. Upon arrival the Engine 4 crew reported a smoke condition on the ground floor of the School St. side of the multi-story apartment building. A first alarm was struck and Command was established on the School St. side of the building. An attack line was stretched into the ground floor doorway into Apartment A, and the fire in that apartment was quickly knocked down. However, the fire had already extended into voids in the construction and was rapidly extending to the upper floors. The Rescue 1 crew of Firefighters Linda Henry and Sean Thistle was assigned to search and evacuate the residents of the building, while the West Gloucester crew laid a 4" water supply line. The crew from Bay View joined the Engine 4 crew in stretching a 2nd attack line into the first floor. Conditions rapidly deteriorated and a 2nd alarm was struck. Attack crews attempted to contain the fire while the Rescue crew continued to search, but unfortunately interior conditions became untenable and crews were ordered out of the building before they were able to complete the search of the top floors. At this time smoke and fire were visible on every floor, and 3rd and 4th alarms were struck. A barely conscious victim was noticed in a window on the 3rd floor on the Temple side of the building, and crews extended a ground ladder to the window where he was last seen. Firefighter Mark Nicastro entered the smoke and heat filled building through the window and found the victim on the floor, but by this time fire conditions in the building were severe and Firefighter Nicastro had to make an emergency head first exit out of the window, where he was assisted by Firefighter Brian McKinnon down the ladder. Mutual Aid companies responded, setting up master streams and ladder pipes on every corner of the building. A staging area for incoming Mutual Aid apparatus was established at the Shaw's Market parking lot on Railroad Ave. The building quickly became fully involved, and apparatus were forced to relocate as a result of the threat of building collapse. Fifth and Sixth alarms were transmitted as fire embers were falling over the downtown area. The rear decks collapsed

**L Authorization**

02543 Aiello, Stephen M DC \_\_\_\_\_ 12 15 2007  
 Officer in charge ID Signature Position or rank Assignment Month Day Year

02543 Aiello, Stephen M DC \_\_\_\_\_ 12 15 2007  
 Check this box if Officer making report ID Signature Position or rank Assignment Month Day Year



09107	MA	MM	DD	YYYY	1	07-0004208	000	Complete Narrative
FDDP *	State *	12	14	2007	Station	Incident Number *	Exposure *	

**Narrative:**

Received calls for activated fire alarms at 80 Middle St., the Lorraine Apartments. Upon arrival the Engine 4 crew reported a smoke condition on the ground floor of the School St. side of the multi-story apartment building. A first alarm was struck and Command was established on the School St. side of the building. An attack line was stretched into the ground floor doorway into Apartment A, and the fire in that apartment was quickly knocked down. However, the fire had already extended into voids in the construction and was rapidly extending to the upper floors. The Rescue 1 crew of Firefighters Linda Henry and Sean Thistle was assigned to search and evacuate the residents of the building, while the West Gloucester crew laid a 4" water supply line. The crew from Bay View joined the Engine 4 crew in stretching a 2nd attack line into the first floor. Conditions rapidly deteriorated and a 2nd alarm was struck. Attack crews attempted to contain the fire while the Rescue crew continued to search, but unfortunately interior conditions became untenable and crews were ordered out of the building before they were able to complete the search of the top floors. At this time smoke and fire were visible on every floor, and 3rd and 4th alarms were struck. A barely conscious victim was noticed in a window on the 3rd floor on the Temple side of the building, and crews extended a ground ladder to the window where he was last seen. Firefighter Mark Nicastro entered the smoke and heat filled building through the window and found the victim on the floor, but by this time fire conditions in the building were severe and Firefighter Nicastro had to make an emergency head first exit out of the window, where he was assisted by Firefighter Brian McKinnon down the ladder. Mutual Aid companies responded, setting up master streams and ladder pipes on every corner of the building. A staging area for incoming Mutual Aid apparatus was established at the Shaw's Market parking lot on Railroad Ave. The building quickly became fully involved, and apparatus were forced to relocate as a result of the threat of building collapse. Fifth and Sixth alarms were transmitted as fire embers were falling over the downtown area. The rear decks collapsed into the alley next to the Temple Ahavat Achim, and the fire extended to the temple. Crews repositioned to prevent the fire from spreading to the Sawyer Free Library, using large hose lines and ladder pipes from Essex, Danvers, Middleton, and North Reading set up on the corner of Dale Ave and Middle St., and 7th and 8th alarms were sounded, bringing apparatus to the scene from all over the North Shore. Several large hose lines were stretched down to Rogers St. to tap into the 20" water main as there was not sufficient water supply in the neighborhood surrounding the buildings to fight a fire of this magnitude. Crews poured several thousand gallons of water per minute onto the fire for several hours before it was contained.

Tenants from the Lorraine Apartments and the YMCA rooming house were transported to a temporary shelter at the Fuller School by CATA bus, where officials from the Red Cross were making arrangements for food, shelter, clothing, etc. At the time of the fire there were approximately 20 occupied apartments, 4 vacant apartments, and a business that was closed for the evening.

Deputy Chief Stephen Aiello 12/15/07 09:15



<b>A</b>		FDID *	State *	MM	DD	YYYY	Station	Incident Number *	Exposure *	<input type="checkbox"/> Delete	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change	NFIRS - 10 Personnel
		09107	MA	12	14	2007	1	07-0004208	000			
<b>B</b>	Apparatus or Resource *	Date and Times <small>Check if same as alarm date</small>				Sent	Number of * People	Use	Actions Taken			
Use codes listed below		Month Day Year Hours/mins				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Check ONE box for each apparatus to indicate its main use at the incident.	List up to 4 actions for each apparatus and each personnel.			
1	ID L-2 Type 12	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other			
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49						
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49						
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken					
			<input type="checkbox"/>									
			<input type="checkbox"/>									
			<input type="checkbox"/>									
			<input type="checkbox"/>									
			<input type="checkbox"/>									
2	ID R-1 Type 71	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other			
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49						
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49						
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken					
3	ID R-2 Type 71	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other			
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49						
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49						
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken					

NFIRS-10 Revision 11/17/98



A		MM DD YYYY		Station		Incident Number		Exposure		NFIRS - 10 Personnel	
FDID * 09107		State * MA		Incident Date * 12 14 2007		1		07-0004208		000	
B Apparatus or Resource		Date and Times Check if same as alarm date				Sent	Number of * People	Use Check ONE box for each apparatus to indicate its main use at the incident.		Actions Taken List up to 4 actions for each apparatus and each personnel.	
Use codes listed below		Month Day Year Hours/mins				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other			
1	ID R-3	Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	Sent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	
	Type 71	Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49				
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49				
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken			
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
2	ID	Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/>					Sent	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Type	Arrival	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken			
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
3	ID	Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/>					Sent	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Type	Arrival	<input type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken			
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							
				<input type="checkbox"/>							

NFIRS-10 Revision 11/17/98



A		MM DD YYYY		Station		Incident Number		Exposure		NFIRS - 10 Personnel	
FDID * 09107		State * MA		Incident Date * 12 14 2007		Station 1		Incident Number * 07-0004208		Exposure * 000	
B Apparatus or Resource		Date and Times Check if same as alarm date				Sent	Number of * People	Use		Actions Taken	
Use codes listed below		Month Day Year Hours/mins				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Check ONE box for each apparatus to indicate its main use at the incident.		List up to 4 actions for each apparatus and each personnel.	
1	ID E-5	Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	Sent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suppression	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Type 11	Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49		<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49		<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken				
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
2	ID E-6	Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	Sent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suppression	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Type 11	Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49		<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49		<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken				
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
3	ID L-1	Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	Sent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suppression	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Type 12	Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49		<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49		<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken				
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								
			<input type="checkbox"/>								

NFIRS-10 Revision 11/17/98



A		FDID * 09107		State * MA		MM DD YYYY Incident Date * 12 14 2007		Station 1		Incident Number * 07-0004208		Exposure * 000		<input type="checkbox"/> Delete <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change NFIRS - 10 Personnel	
B Apparatus or Resource *		Date and Times Check if same as alarm date Month Day Year Hours/mins						Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Number of * People	Use Check ONE box for each apparatus to indicate its main use at the incident. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other			Actions Taken List up to 4 actions for each apparatus and each personnel.		
1 ID E-2 Type 11		Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12 14 2007 23:46		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12 14 2007 23:49		Clear <input type="checkbox"/> 12 15 2007 23:49		Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0						
Personnel ID		Name				Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken				
							<input type="checkbox"/>								
2 ID E-3 Type 11		Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12 14 2007 23:46		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12 14 2007 23:49		Clear <input type="checkbox"/> 12 15 2007 23:49		Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0						
Personnel ID		Name				Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken				
							<input type="checkbox"/>								
3 ID E-4 Type 11		Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12 14 2007 23:46		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12 14 2007 23:49		Clear <input type="checkbox"/> 12 15 2007 23:49		Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0						
Personnel ID		Name				Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken				
							<input type="checkbox"/>								

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<b>A</b>		MM DD YYYY	FDID <u>09107</u> *		State <u>MA</u> *	Incident Date <u>12</u> <u>14</u> <u>2007</u> *	Station <u>1</u>	Incident Number <u>07-0004208</u> *	Exposure <u>000</u> *	<input type="checkbox"/> Delete	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change	NEIRS - 10 Personnel	
<b>B Apparatus or Resource</b> *		Date and Times Check if same as alarm date					Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Number of People	Use	Actions Taken			
Use codes listed below		Month	Day	Year	Hours/mins			Check ONE box for each apparatus to indicate its main use at the incident.	List up to 4 actions for each apparatus and each personnel.				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1	ID <u>C-1</u>	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:46</u>	Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>60</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression	<input type="checkbox"/> EMS	<input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Type <u>92</u>	Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:49</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:49</u>						<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken						
01080	McRobb, Andrew	CPT	X										
01082	Appt, Barry	CPT	X										
01083	Barbagallo, Dominic	FFP	X										
01086	LoGrande, Gaetano	CPT	X										
01087	Bazdanes, Theodore	FFE	X										
01088	Smith, Michael	FFE	X										
01089	Marchant, Gregory	FFE	X										
01090	Sayess, Thomas	FFE	X										
01091	Wonson, Bruce	FFE	X										
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2	ID <u>C-2</u>	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:46</u>	Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>0</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression	<input type="checkbox"/> EMS	<input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Type <u>92</u>	Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:49</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:49</u>						<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3	ID <u>E-1</u>	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:46</u>	Sent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>0</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression	<input type="checkbox"/> EMS	<input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Type <u>11</u>	Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:49</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	<u>12</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>23:49</u>						<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Personnel ID	Name	Rank or Grade	Attend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken	Action Taken						

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A		MM DD YYYY		Station		Incident Number		Exposure		NFIRS - 9, Apparatus or Resources	
FDID *		State *		Incident Date *		Station		Incident Number *		Exposure *	
09107		MA		12 14 2007		1		07-0004208		000	
Delete		Change									
B Apparatus or * Resource		Date and Times				Sent	Number of *	Use		Actions Taken	
		Check if same as alarm date				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	People	Check ONE box for each apparatus to indicate its main use at the incident.			
		Month	Day	Year	Hour	Min					
1 ID L-2		Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type 12		Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49			<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
2 ID R-1		Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type 71		Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49			<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
3 ID R-2		Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type 71		Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49			<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
4 ID R-3		Dispatch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type 71		Arrival	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49			<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
5 ID		Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type		Arrival	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
6 ID		Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type		Arrival	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
7 ID		Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type		Arrival	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
8 ID		Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type		Arrival	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
9 ID		Dispatch	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Suppression
Type		Arrival	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	EMS
		Clear	<input type="checkbox"/>							<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
Type of Apparatus or Resources											
Ground Fire Suppression				Marine Equipment				More Apparatus? Use Additional Sheets			
11 Engine				51 Fire boat with pump							
12 Truck or aerial				52 Boat, no pump							
13 Quint				50 Marine apparatus, other							
14 Tanker & pumper combination				Support Equipment							
16 Brush truck				61 Breathing apparatus support				Other			
17 ARF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting)				62 Light and air unit				91 Mobile command post			
10 Ground fire suppression, other				60 Support apparatus, other				92 Chief officer car			
Heavy Ground Equipment				Medical & Rescue				93 HazMat unit			
21 Dozer or plow				71 Rescue unit				94 Type 1 hand crew			
22 Tractor				72 Urban Search & rescue unit				95 Type 2 hand crew			
24 Tanker or tender				73 High angle rescue unit				99 Privately owned vehicle			
20 Heavy equipment, other				75 ELS unit				00 Other apparatus/resource			
Aircraft				76 ALS unit				NN None			
41 Aircraft: fixed wing tanker				70 Medical and rescue unit, other				UU Undetermined			
42 Helitanker											
43 Helicopter											
40 Aircraft, other											
NFIRS-9 Revision 11/17/98											



A		MM DD YYYY				Station		Incident Number		Exposure		Delete <input type="checkbox"/> Change <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		NFIRS - 9 Apparatus or Resources	
FDID *		State *		Incident Date *		Station		Incident Number *		Exposure *		Delete <input type="checkbox"/> Change <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		NFIRS - 9 Apparatus or Resources	
09107		MA		12 14 2007		1		07-0004208		000		<input type="checkbox"/> Delete <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change		NFIRS - 9 Apparatus or Resources	
B Apparatus or * Resource		Date and Times Check if same as alarm date Month Day Year Hour Min				Sent	Number of * People	Use Check ONE box for each apparatus to indicate its main use at the incident.		Actions Taken					
1	ID C-1 Type 92	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	60	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
2	ID C-2 Type 92	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
3	ID E-1 Type 11	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
4	ID E-2 Type 11	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
5	ID E-3 Type 11	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
6	ID E-4 Type 11	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
7	ID E-5 Type 11	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
8	ID E-6 Type 11	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									
9	ID L-1 Type 12	Dispatch <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:46	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suppression <input type="checkbox"/> EMS <input type="checkbox"/> Other						
		Arrival <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	12	14	2007	23:49	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								
		Clear <input type="checkbox"/>	12	15	2007	23:49									



FDJD * 09107		State * MA		Incident Date * 12/14/2007		Station 1		Incident Number * 07-0004208		Exposure * 000		NFIRS - 4 Civilian Fire Casualty	
Injured Person * 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Male 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Female										C Casualty * Number			
First Name Robert										Last Name Taylor		Casualty Number 1	
D Age or date of birth * Age 70 <input type="checkbox"/> Months (for Infants)		E1 Race 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> White 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Black 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Am. Indian, Eskimo 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Asian 0 <input type="checkbox"/> Other, multi-racial U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		F Affiliation 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Civilian 2 <input type="checkbox"/> EMS, not fire department 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Police 0 <input type="checkbox"/> Other				H Severity * 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Minor 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Severe 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Life threatening 5 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Death					
OR 6/6/1937 Month Day Year		E2 Ethnicity <input type="checkbox"/> Hispanic		G Date & Time of Injury 12/14/2007 Midnight is 0000. Month Day Year Hour Minutes									
I Cause of Injury 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Exposed to fire products including flame heat, smoke, & gas 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Exposed to toxic fumes other than smoke 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Jumped in escape attempt 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Fell, slipped or tripped 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Caught or trapped 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Structural collapse 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Struck by/or contact with object 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Overexertion 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Multiple causes 0 <input type="checkbox"/> Other U <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Undetermined				J Human Factors Contributing to Injury <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None Check all applicable boxes 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Asleep 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Unconscious 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Possibly impaired by alcohol 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Possibly impaired by other drug 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Possibly mentally disabled 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Physically disabled 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Physically restrained 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Unattended person				K Factors Contributing to Injury <input type="checkbox"/> None Enter up to three contributing factors 10 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Egress problem, Contributing factor (1) Contributing factor (2) Contributing factor (3)					
L Activity When Injured 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Escaping 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Rescue attempt 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Fire control 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Return to fire before control 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Return to fire after control 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Sleeping 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Unable to act 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Irrational act 0 <input type="checkbox"/> Other U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		M1 Location at Time of Incident 1 <input type="checkbox"/> In area of origin and not involved 2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not in area of origin & not involved 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Not in area of origin, but involved 4 <input type="checkbox"/> In area or origin and involved U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		M2 General Location at Time of Injury Check ONE Box. If undetermined, leave blank and skip to Section N. 1 <input type="checkbox"/> In area of fire origin <input type="checkbox"/> Skip To Section N 2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In building, but not in area 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Outside, but not in area <input type="checkbox"/> Skip to Section M5		M3 Story at Time of Incident Complete ONLY if injury occurred INSIDE Story at START of incident 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Below Grade M4 Story Where Injury Occurred Story where injury occurred, if different from M3 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Below Grade M5 Specific Location at Time of Injury Complete ONLY if casualty NOT in area of origin UU <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined Specific location at time of injury							
N Primary Apparent Symptom 01 <input type="checkbox"/> Smoke only, asphyxiation 11 <input type="checkbox"/> Burns & smoke inhalation 12 <input type="checkbox"/> Burns only 21 <input type="checkbox"/> Cut, laceration 33 <input type="checkbox"/> Strain or sprain 96 <input type="checkbox"/> Shock 98 <input type="checkbox"/> Pain only Look up code only if the symptom is NOT found above UU <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined Primary apparent symptom		O Primary Area of Body Injured 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Head 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Neck & shoulder 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Thorax 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Abdomen 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Spine 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Upper extremities 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Lower extremities 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Internal 9 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Multiple body parts		P Disposition <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transported to emergency care facility Remarks Local option Victim Robert Taylor was observed in a 3rd floor window gasping for air. Mr. Taylor communicated to firefighters that he could not breathe due to the heat and smoke. Firefighters immediately attempted a rescue by placing a ground ladder to the 3rd floor NFIRS-4 Revision 11/17/98									



09107 FDID	MA State	12 14 Incident Date	2007	1 Station	07-0004208 Incident Number	000 Exposure	Responding Units/Personnel
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Unit	Notify Time	Enroute Time	Arrival Time	Cleared Time
C-1 Car 1	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00

Staff ID	Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
01080	McRobb, Andrew W	Fire On Standby	Captain		
01082	Aptt, Barry M	Fire On Standby	Captain		
01083	Barbagallo, Dominic T	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01086	LoGrande, Gaetano S	Fire On Standby	Captain		
01087	Bazdanes, Theodore R	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01088	Smith, Michael E	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01089	Marchant, Gregory G	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01090	Sayess, Thomas W	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01091	Wonson, Bruce M	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01092	Doucette, William A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01093	Sonia, Michael K	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01119	Fuller, Robert J	Fire On Standby	Captain		
01145	Kennedy, Daniel P	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01146	Trupiano, Anthony N	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01147	Lovett, David P	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01204	Wonson, Darryl J	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01237	Schlichte, Miles J	Fire On Standby	Deputy Chief		
01665	Rivas, Robert B	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01666	Grover, Robert W	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
01667	LeClerc, Frank J	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
02543	Aiello, Stephen M	Fire On Standby	Deputy Chief		
02800	Aiello, Thomas L	Fire On Standby	Deputy Chief		
0509	Prince, Jay W	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
06398	Asaro, Glen S	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
09903	Aiello, Joseph L	Fire On Standby	Captain		
105556	Henry, Linda A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
105587	Karvelas, Christopher J	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
105588	Hudson, Paul A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
109543	Hannon, James	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
109721	LoCoco, Jason W.	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
109757	Nicastro, Marc	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
109758	Gambale, Domenic A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
1151	Schultz, Sander R	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
14365	Capillo, James R	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
1441	Blanchard, Carol T	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
1443	Carroll, Clinton J	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
1489	Christopher, Eric J	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
1507	Ketchopulos, Sean A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
1512	Silva, Randall M	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
1525	Harvey, Philip E	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
18991	Cooney, Stephen L	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
22589	Day, Jack H	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
23617	Dench, Philip S	Fire On Standby	Deputy Chief		
35182	Frontiero, Jerome P	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
55485	LoGrande, Matteo	Fire On Standby	Captain		
57027	MacArthur, Douglas A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
62681	McCarthy, Michael P	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
63966	McKinnon, Brian H	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
67050	Misuraca, Joseph P	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
68592	Mitchell, Stephen A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
7073	Capuccio, Stephen A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
89666	Savage, Thomas H	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
98661	Wonson, Arthur S	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		



09107 FDID	MA State	12 14 Incident Date	2007	1 Station	07-0004208 Incident Number	000 Exposure	Responding Units/Personnel
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Unit	Notify Time	Enroute Time	Arrival Time	Cleared Time
C-1 Car 1	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00

Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
99201 Scola, Charles A	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
99256 Sanger, Jonathan C	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
CONT01 Contilli, Michael L	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
DEBR01 deBrigard, Adam	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
KNAA01 Knaak, Jeffrey	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
POOL01 Pool, Jeff	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		
THIS01 Thistle, Sean	Fire On Standby	Firefighter		

C-2 Car 2	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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E-1 Engine 1	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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E-2 Engine 2	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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E-3 Engine 3	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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E-4 Engine 4	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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09107 FDID	MA State	12   14 Incident Date	2007	1 Station	07-0004208 Incident Number	000 Exposure	Responding Units/Personnel
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Unit	Notify Time	Enroute Time	Arrival Time	Cleared Time
E-5 Engine 5	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00

Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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E-6 Engine 6	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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L-1 Ladder 1	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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L-2 Ladder 2	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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R-1 Rescue 1	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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R-2 Rescue 2	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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R-3 Rescue 3	23:46:52	23:46:52	23:49:00	23:49:00
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Activity	Rank	Position	Role
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09107 FDID *	MA State *	MM 12	DD 14	YYYY 2007	1 Station	07-0004208 Incident Number *	000 Exposure *	Responding Personnel
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Staff ID\Staff Name	Unit	Activity	Position	Rank	PayScl	Hrs	HrsPd	Pts
01080 McRobb, Andrew W	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		CPT		24.1	0.00	0.00
01082 Aptt, Barry M	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		CPT		24.1	0.00	0.00
01083 Barbagallo, Dominic	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
01086 LoGrande, Gaetano S	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		CPT		24.1	0.00	0.00
01087 Bazdanes, Theodore	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01088 Smith, Michael E	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01089 Marchant, Gregory G	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01090 Sayess, Thomas W	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01091 Wonson, Bruce M	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01092 Doucette, William A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		MEC		24.1	0.00	0.00
01093 Sonia, Michael K	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
01119 Fuller, Robert J	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		CPT		24.1	0.00	0.00
01145 Kennedy, Daniel P	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01146 Trupiano, Anthony N	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01147 Lovett, David P	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01204 Wonson, Darryl J	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01237 Schlichte, Miles J	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		DC		24.1	0.00	0.00
01665 Rivas, Robert B	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01666 Grover, Robert W	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
01667 LeClerc, Frank J	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
02543 Aiello, Stephen M	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		DC		24.1	0.00	0.00
02800 Aiello, Thomas L	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		DC		24.1	0.00	0.00
0509 Prince, Jay W	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
06398 Asaro, Glen S	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
09903 Aiello, Joseph L	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		CPT		24.1	0.00	0.00
105556 Henry, Linda A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
105587 Karvelas,	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
105588 Hudson, Paul A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
109543 Hannon, James	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
109721 LoCoco, Jason W.	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
109757 Nicastro, Marc	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
109758 Gambale, Domenic A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
1151 Schultz, Sander R	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
14365 Capillo, James R	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
1441 Blanchard, Carol T	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
1443 Carroll, Clinton J	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
1489 Christopher, Eric J	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFP		24.1	0.00	0.00
1507 Ketchopulos, Sean A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
1512 Silva, Randall M	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
1525 Harvey, Philip E	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FFE		24.1	0.00	0.00
18991 Cooney, Stephen L	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
22589 Day, Jack H	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		FF		24.1	0.00	0.00
23617 Dench, Philip S	C-1	FS Fire On Standby		DC		24.1	0.00	0.00

An 'X' next to the unit denotes driver.



FDID *	State *	MM	DD	YYYY	Station	Incident Number *	Exposure *	Responding Personnel		
09107	MA	12	14	2007	1	07-0004208	000			
35182	Frontiero, Jerome P	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	MEC			24.1	0.00	0.00	
55485	LoGrande, Matteo	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	CPT			24.1	0.00	0.00	
57027	MacArthur, Douglas	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FF			24.1	0.00	0.00	
62681	McCarthy, Michael P	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFE			24.1	0.00	0.00	
63966	McKinnon, Brian H	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FF			24.1	0.00	0.00	
67050	Misuraca, Joseph P	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFE			24.1	0.00	0.00	
68592	Mitchell, Stephen A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FF			24.1	0.00	0.00	
7073	Capuccio, Stephen A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFP			24.1	0.00	0.00	
89666	Savage, Thomas H	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FF			24.1	0.00	0.00	
98661	Wonson, Arthur S	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFE			24.1	0.00	0.00	
99201	Scola, Charles A	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFE			24.1	0.00	0.00	
99256	Sanger, Jonathan C	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFP			24.1	0.00	0.00	
CONT01	Contilli, Michael	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FF			24.1	0.00	0.00	
DEBR01	deBrigard, Adam	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFP			24.1	0.00	0.00	
KNAA01	Knaak, Jeffrey	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFP			24.1	0.00	0.00	
POOL01	Pool, Jeff	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFP			24.1	0.00	0.00	
THIS01	Thistle, Sean	C-1	FS Fire On Standby	FFP			24.1	0.00	0.00	

Total Participants: 60

Total Personnel Hours: 1443.0

An 'X' next to the unit denotes driver.



09107	MA	MM	DD	YYYY	1	07-0004208	000	NFIRS - Involvement User Fields
FDID	State	12	14	2007	Station	Incident Number	Exposure	

**Involvement**  
Name:  
Burton, Ann

**Involvement**  
Type:

Owner:    Occupant:





<b>I1 Structure Type *</b> If fire was in enclosed building or a portable/mobile structure complete the rest of this form		<b>I2 Building Status *</b>		<b>I3 Building * Height</b> Count the ROOF as part of the highest story		<b>I4 Main Floor Size*</b> NFIRS-3 Structure Fire	
1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed Building 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Portable/mobile structure 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Open structure 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Air supported structure 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Tent 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Open platform (e.g. piers) 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Underground structure (work areas) 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Connective structure (e.g. fences) 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Other type of structure		1 <input type="checkbox"/> Under construction 2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Occupied & operating 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Idle, not routinely used 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Under major renovation 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Vacant and secured 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Vacant and unsecured 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Being demolished 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Other 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		Total number of stories at or above grade: <u>005</u> Total number of stories below grade: <u>        </u>		Total square feet: <u>        </u> , <u>006</u> , <u>400</u> OR Length in feet: <u>        </u> , <u>080</u> BY Width in feet: <u>        </u> , <u>080</u>	
<b>J1 Fire Origin *</b> <u>001</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Below Grade Story of fire origin		<b>J3 Number of Stories Damaged By Flame</b> Count the ROOF as part of the highest story		<b>K Material Contributing Most To Flame Spread</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Check if no flame spread OR same as material first ignited OR unable to determine <b>Skip To Section L</b>			
<b>J2 Fire Spread *</b> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Confined to object of origin 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Confined to room of origin 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Confined to floor of origin 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Confined to building of origin 5 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Beyond building of origin		Number of stories w/ minor damage (1 to 24% flame damage): <u>        </u> Number of stories w/ significant damage (25 to 49% flame damage): <u>        </u> Number of stories w/ heavy damage (50 to 74% flame damage): <u>        </u> Number of stories w/ extreme damage (75 to 100% flame damage): <u>        </u>		<b>K1</b> <u>        </u> Item contributing most to flame spread <b>K2</b> <u>        </u> Type of material contributing most of flame spread <small>Required only if item contributing code is 00 cr10</small>			
<b>L1 Presence of Detectors *</b> (In area of the fire) N <input type="checkbox"/> None Present <b>Skip to section M</b> 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Present U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		<b>L3 Detector Power Supply</b> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Battery only 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Hardwire only 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Plug in 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Hardwire with battery 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Plug in with battery 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanical 7 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Multiple detectors & power supplies 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Other <u>        </u> U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		<b>L5 Detector Effectiveness</b> Required if detector operated 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Alerted Occupants, occupants responded 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Occupants failed to respond 3 <input type="checkbox"/> There were no occupants 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Failed to alert occupants U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined			
<b>L2 Detector Type</b> 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Smoke 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Heat 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Combination smoke - heat 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Sprinkler, water flow detection 5 <input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 type present 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Other <u>        </u> U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		<b>L4 Detector Operation</b> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Fire too small to activate 2 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Operated (Complete Section L5) 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Failed to Operate (Complete Section L5) U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		<b>L6 Detector Failure Reason</b> Required if detector failed to operate 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Power failure, shutoff or disconnect 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Improper installation or placement 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Defective 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of maintenance, includes cleaning 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Battery missing or disconnected 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Battery discharged or dead 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Other <u>        </u> U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined			
<b>M1 Presence of Automatic Extinguishment System *</b> N <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None Present 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Present <b>Complete rest of Section M</b>		<b>M3 Automatic Extinguishment System Operation</b> Required if fire was within designed range 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Operated & effective (Go to M4) 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Operated & not effective (M4) 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Fire too small to activate 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Failed to operate (Go to M5) 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Other U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		<b>M5 Automatic Extinguishment System Failure Reason</b> Required if system failed 1 <input type="checkbox"/> System shut off 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Not enough agent discharged 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Agent discharged but did not reach fire 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Wrong type of system 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Fire not in area protected 6 <input type="checkbox"/> System components damaged 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of maintenance 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Manual Intervention 9 <input type="checkbox"/> Other <u>        </u> U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined			
<b>M2 Type of Automatic Extinguishment System *</b> Required if fire was within designed range of AES 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Wet pipe sprinkler 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Dry pipe sprinkler 3 <input type="checkbox"/> Other sprinkler system 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Dry chemical system 5 <input type="checkbox"/> Foam system 6 <input type="checkbox"/> Halogen type system 7 <input type="checkbox"/> Carbon dioxide (CO <sub>2</sub> ) system 8 <input type="checkbox"/> Other special hazard system U <input type="checkbox"/> Undetermined		<b>M4 Number of Sprinkler Heads Operating</b> Required if system operated <u>        </u> Number of sprinkler heads operating		NFIRS-3 Revision 01/19/99			



***APPENDIX B***

***STREET MAP***

***80 MIDDLE STREET***




**Municipal  
Resources  
Inc.**



**Municipal  
Resources**

# Street Map- Incident Location - 80 Middle Street



# ***APPENDIX C***

## ***FIRE CHIEF McKAY'S AFTER ACTION REPORT NOVEMBER 26, 2008***



**Municipal  
Resources  
Inc.**



**Municipal  
Resources**



# Post Incident Analysis Worksheet

The purpose of this worksheet is to provide information and feedback for a Post Incident Analysis for the City of Gloucester. Please discuss the incident in depth with members of your Fire Company or Fire Department that participated in the incident and complete the form below. All forms are to be returned to the Municipal Resources incorporated for further analysis.

## Incident Commander Input Form

*Note: This portion of the report should only be completed by the Incident Commander or by each position in a Unified Command. If the Incident Command was transferred throughout the incident each IC should complete the form independently.*

Incident Date: 12/14/07

Incident #: 07-0004208

Location: 80 Middle Street

Officer Completing Form: Barry S. McKay, Fire Chief

Agency: Gloucester Fire Department

Notification Time: 13:49

Was the media notified of the incident?  Yes  No

Describe the building including occupancy, age, type of construction, size, and built in protection.

See Attached

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Post Incident Analysis Worksheet  
Municipal Resources Inc.



**Describe the building including occupancy, age, type of construction and built in protection:**  
The occupancy of the building was mixed use business and apartments on the first (basement level from the Middle Street side) and four stories of apartments above the basement level. The age of the structure is approximately 1900 (per assessor's records). The type of construction is ordinary construction masonry (i.e., primary stucco) exterior and wood framed interior. The size of the building 50 feet on the A & C (Middle Street) sides, and 113 feet on the B & D (School Street and Temple) sides of the building. The Middle Street side was flush with the D side and extended towards School Street for 28 feet. On the B (School Street side), the front (Middle Street side) remained 28 feet wide for 34 feet then expanded out to 113 feet creating an "L" shape on the School Street side where the first floor main entrance was located at the base of the "L". The fire protection was, based on reviews with all parties, battery powered smoke detectors throughout the structure, both in the common hallways and apartments. There was no sprinkler system or monitoring of the fire alarm system. The interior of the structure had open wood stairwells leading to the B and D sides, a mechanical elevator and air/light shaft located towards the C side in the 50 foot deep by 113 foot long section of the building.

**Describe the number and types of occupants:** The number of occupants, based on the police interviews following the fire were 25. There were 25 apartments, including the Doctor's office, in the basement. There were four vacant apartments at the time of the fire. The type of occupants were a mix of working people, at least one artist, and older, in some cases retired, people.

**Incident origin and cause.**

The official cause remains undetermined with a strong likely hood of an accidental cause based on witness observations and statements. The incident origin was in or adjacent to apartment A in the basement level.

Was the Unified Incident Command established:  Yes  No

**INCIDENT COMMAND:**

What positions were staffed and the assignments made? Using a typical Incident Command Chart please note which groups or divisions or roles you assigned throughout the incident (Attachment 1)

Incident Commander  
Operations Officer  
Staging Officer  
Water supply officers  
Public Information Officer (retained by I/C)  
Failed attempt to establish Safety Officer

**How was command assumed:**

Under department SOP (Attachment 2) the first arriving officer or senior man assumes command. In this case, the arrival of the Deputy Fire Chief was moments after the arrival of the Engine 4 company officer. Command was established and radioed by Deputy Steve Aiello upon arrival. After I arrived and sized-up the fire building, I took command via direct face to face communication with Deputy Steve Aiello, radioed the dispatcher and all personnel on scene I had taken command, and made Deputy Steve Aiello operations officer on the A/D side as we prepared for defensive operations with heavy fire conditions and exposure protection anticipated.

**Where was the command post:**

The command post was established on School Street at the left front corner (looking from School Street) of Fire Headquarters. I chose this location for several reasons. First, it was on a B/C corner which provided observation of two full sides of the building, the first and second in pump locations, and ladder 2's location (in case window rescues were to be made) and operation. The second reason was the location gave me direct access to inside fire Headquarters where crews and people were congregating. Third, Fire fighters reporting into Headquarters on the call backs would be more likely to have to pass by the command post than on the A side and thus control/deployment of in coming off-duty fire fighters would be easier as well as placing a RIT inside the station. A fourth reason was the B/C side was up wind and provided the best visibility of the fire verses spending hours in the smoke on the A and D side. I am hoping the radio tapes by the police will show that I announced the command post location as the southeast corner of Fire Headquarters. Fifth, I knew early on (within the first hour) that command vans from the Fire Marshal's office were coming and the area in front of fire Headquarters was ample for their position. As a final reason, as our area rehabilitation support group (Rehab 5) arrived, he was positioned in the parking lot between fire Headquarters and the Trinity Church to the south on the B side. The command post was thus close to the rehab area and within eye sight of the rehab area. This is an issue for knowledge of rehab use and redeployment of personnel once rested, warmed and rehydrated.

**Describe the situation upon arrival:**

I was monitoring radio communications both at my home and as I drove from my home to the scene. I heard the report of smoke showing and a report of a working fire by the IC (Steve Aiello) a radio report by Captain Aptt to the IC that he thought they had the fire knocked down and were checking for extension. With 26 years of responding and monitoring radio communications, I can, with a fair amount of confidence, tell by the nature of the communications (ex. yelling voices through air masks), the communications tenor (calm or excited), changes in the tenor of communications, amount and urgency of communications, and quickness of multiple alarms being transmitted to name a few factors, how the general scene operations are going and urgency of the incident. In this case the communications were becoming less urgent and suddenly a second alarm was transmitted by the incident commander which meant to me conditions or concerns were being raised. As I arrived I parked on the B (parking lot) side, donned full protective gear, saw Engine 6 connected to the hydrant on Mason Street with charged large diameter hose running to the B side of the building, saw ladder 2 on the B/C corner of the building with its aerial to the B side of the building, the Deputy Chief's car was in the parking lot, an ambulance was in the parking lot and I believe our second ambulance was arriving on School Street in front of Fire headquarters as I moved across the parking lot to find I/C Steve Aiello. There was very light smoke on the B side and no smoke showing anywhere else. I spoke with Deputy Steve Aiello who reported crews inside checking for extension, searching the building (only a 2 member search team at this point) and that he had struck the second for more search capabilities and in case the fire was extending up into the structure although at that moment it did not appear to be. Deputy Aiello expressed concern for rescue crews operating above a potential fire and I agreed. I left Deputy Steve Aiello in charge on the B side and told him I was going to do a size up. I moved from the B to C then D side of the building. Based on my knowledge of the building I entered the D side via a porch into the first floor apartment. There was no smoke in the apartment. As I moved to the main interior corridor, I could see smoke to my right but the main corridor was nearly smoke free. As I reached the B side first floor main entrance I met Fire fighter Mark Nicastro in work uniform (no protective clothing on) assisting in stretching a 1.75 inch hand line into the corridor I was exiting. I stop briefly to guide the members in piecing out the 1.75 inch line in the easiest manner. I then walked towards the Fire Headquarters on School Street seeking the I/C. I noted people standing in the cold in sleep wear. The look on many of the faces was bewilderment and shock. As I walked to Deputy Aiello, the smoke conditions suddenly worsened and smoke began to show from the mortar cracks on the B/C side. Radio communications from interior personnel became more urgent reporting fire in walls and searches on going. Both Deputy Steve Aiello and I knew conditions were

going to worsen quickly with fire fighters doing interior searches, fire fighting and not being able to account for all residents.

**What Plan of action did you use to combat the situation when you took command.**

Upon taking command, I added third and fourth alarms to have four pumps and an additional ladder truck responding in addition to the 2 pumps and the ladder truck moving to Gloucester on the second alarm. Having assigned Deputy Steve Aiello to operations, specifically to size up the A/D sides and set up a pump and ladder at the A/D corner, the plan was set up for a transition from an interior search, rescue and fire fighting operation to a exterior fire attack and , if necessary, defensive operation. The plan was to place the second alarm ladder (Essex) and a pump (Manchester or Rockport) on the A/D side. I knew the A/D side had some limited access for ladder rescues if necessary. As the fourth floor still had not been searched based on radio communications to the interior crews, the exterior conditions and occasional flash of fire in the C side stairwell and windows required evacuation of the building as the interior crews were in increasing danger. The order was given to evacuate the building via radio and by air horn operation on Ladder 2. At approximately this time Deputy Street Aiello was reporting a victim in a window on the third floor of the D side. This required a shift to an exterior rescue attempt via ladder. The fifth and sixth alarms were transmitted as the lack of personnel on scene was hindering moving a ground ladder to the D side to support Deputy Steve Aiello. Search and rescue crews and the interior fire fighters had not yet to emerge from the building. As the interior crews began to emerge from the B side main first floor entrance, I directed Captain Aptt to perform a personnel accountability review (PAR). I established a staging area at the Shaw's Market parking lot two blocks north from the Station and directed Captain Joe Aiello to take our pickup truck to the staging area for use of the mobile radio should Joe's personally assigned Department portable radio have trouble communicating (not a problem in the operations due to the short direct VHF communications). Once the interior crews were reported as safe, I directed Captain Aptt and crews to ready for ladder pipes and heavy stream appliances (i.e., the deck gun on Engine 4 on the B side near the A corner, ladder pipes into operation on Ladder 2, a portable deluge gun to the C side and set up of additional ladder trucks in safe locations from collapse) for exterior fire control. Obviously, the interior crews were not fresh and they did the best they could with their remaining energy. Whether direct fire attack could knock down the fire or exposure protection would be needed was questionable. As the exterior ladder rescue was underway, the fire was lighting up stairwells and window on the C side. The fire also self vented through the roof. As off duty personnel and mutual aid reported in to command, they were assigned to support the strategy of surrounding the fire with master streams in safe locations and establishing the water supply to support these operations. The police commander was asked to do a tenant check to attempt to identify any other missing residents/visitors to the Lorraine Apartments. No written action plan was established due to the lack of a scribe in a staff position.

**Describe any changes made during this process**

The prior question describes the change from interior search and rescue as well as fire fighting to an exterior operation and a change to support an exterior ground ladder rescue attempt. This latter operation took the Operation's Officer from his assigned duties of coordinating a ladder on the A/D side with a pump to supply it's ladder pipe out of position. Deputy Steve Aiello reported quickly that the rescue attempt failed and returned to his assigned duties on the A/D side.

**Describe any assignments made to achieve the Plan of Action**

In addition to the staging officer and location assignment, Deputy Steve Aiello working operations on the downwind side, and Captain Aptt and Fuller assigned to set up and get heavy stream appliances operating, Deputy Dench reported from off duty and was assigned to the north side to water supply development and Deputy Schlichte was assigned to the south side water supply development. The Mayor was present and traditionally had handled the public information role, utility companies (i.e., gas and especially electric companies were called for control of the utilities such as cutting power lines). Ladder 2 was repositioned out of the collapse zone to a safer location on School Street for broader use of its already operating remotely controlled aerial ladder pipe.

**Strategy and Tactics:** What changes had to be made to facilitate accomplishment and what special problems arose that required special attention?

The immediate problem, as additional heavy stream appliances, were made operational, was the exhaustion of the water supply in the immediate area. As an example, Gloucester Ladder 1 directed to the C/D corner of the building had a totally ineffective stream as did the portable deluge gun set up in the C side parking lot. The strategy of an exterior attack was changed to a defensive exposure protection action plan. The initial collapse zone of 50 feet had to be expanded to 100 feet as the full four story wall on the B side collapsed nearly as a straight wall. The B side collapse created live wires down and overhead hazards (transformers dangling from poles). More importantly, the collapse cut the utilities (power and telephone lines) to Fire Headquarters. This required the station commander to become "creative" in notifying the police dispatch that our dispatch was out of service, transferring all call taking responsibility to the police, assuring our emergency generator power was on line and operating our mutual aid radio as a base radio as our base radio is remote via now downed and out of service telephone lines. The Officers working on water supply (Dench and Schlichte) met with me and were directed to go to Rogers Street (two blocks to the south) to obtain a reliable water supply. I was contemplating exposure involvement in the down wind area and possible exhaustion of the Roger Street main. The next water source would have been drafting from the Harbor at Rogers Street and adjacent locations. Seventh and eighth alarms were transmitted as pumps in staging were dedicated to Roger St. water supply operations as well as spark and brand patrol down wind. A surprise problem to me was the failure of a Gloucester fire officer to assume safety officer's duties assigned by me. We had extreme exposures on the B side (i.e., the Trinity Church was steaming), and on the D side the Temple was being directly exposed to intense radiant heat and collapsing walls that were on fire. The buildings on the opposite side of Middle Street (A side) were in the path of downwind smoke, convected heat, sparks, brands and fortunately less dramatic radiant heat. Additional ladder trucks, with the need for additional water supplies, were assigned to the A and D sides for exposure protection to the Temple, City Library, buildings on the south side of Middle Street and down wind structures. A reported roof fire down wind required special attention but proved to be a good intent report as large falling embers were extinguishing on the snow pack on most roofs. I had difficulty getting a ladder truck placed on the A/B corner with an adequate water supply.

**Apparatus and Equipment:** Was the apparatus placed properly and utilized? Could special equipment not available in the department have completed the assignment faster or in a safer manner?

Overall apparatus and equipment was placed properly and attempts were made to properly utilize the equipment. The water supply problems prevented the portable deluge gun, Ladder 1's ladder pipe and other ladder pipes on the A/D side from having a chance to keep the fire from spreading to the Temple. In hindsight, the direct flame impingement by the collapsing Lorraine building walls on the wood

exterior of the Temple would have been difficult to have stopped even with an adequate water supply. After withdrawing Gloucester Engine 4 from the B side of the building collapse zone, a mutual aid deck gun on the A side was established with a well placed engine company in Center Street at the intersection with Middle Street. This stream was effective on the collapsing building. A portable deluge gun on the A/B side, although with a weak stream, was instrumental in cooling the Trinity Church to prevent ignition. Specialized equipment, in this case, could not have overcome the fast moving fire in walls throughout this five story wood balloon frame constructed building. The lack of water also would not have been overcome by specialized equipment. Having redundant telephone lines entering from another side of Fire Headquarters would have helped reduce the utility interruptions.

**List any orders given:**

The narratives above list many "orders" or directives given. Examples include striking of multiple alarms, assignment of specific duties and responsibilities, establishment and expansion of the collapse zone, relocation of apparatus out of and away from the collapse zone, locating of rehab units on the B and D sides of the incident, through the police commander closure of roads. This latter order was effective as no unauthorized vehicles drove into the operational area as I have seen at prior incidents. Through the DPW liaison in the command post, we had sand spread over the street network surrounding the fire for fire fighter safety. Over the course of the entire incident (three weeks), literally hundreds of orders were issued. As an example, on Wednesday, 12/19/07, I ordered the hiring of off duty fire fighters, to be supported by and rotated with on duty fire fighters due to the cold, to complete fire extinguishment in the smoldering remains of four stories. This order was given after cajoling the property owners into supplying (paying for) an excavator for the day to support removing and spreading out the smoldering remains for extinguishment. This order was made as part of an action plan in support of the need for access for starting the work for recovery of the victim's remains, fire scene investigation, and end the water use from unmanned hand lines and deluge guns that had failed in four days to extinguish the fire.

**Briefly explain any problems encountered, including type, and how resolved:**

I believe the narratives above provides multiple examples of problems encountered and solved. I've learned over many years that solving all problems may take years. As an example, the failure of a Fire Officer to assume the safety officer's duties is complex in that while many personnel talk about incident safety officers, and some have even taken training in this specialty, doing the job is not ingrained into the department culture. When we have appointed safety officers in the past, their roles and responsibilities were not clearly known or accepted thus making the function ineffective. Instead of flipping out, I have read the IFSTA Fire Department Safety Officer, First edition and Dobson's Fire Incident Safety Officer 2nd edition as well as every article available through Firehouse.com so I clearly understand the roles and responsibilities of an incident safety officer. I now know the young fire officer, although well trained in many functions, most likely had no comfort level for what a safety officer's role and responsibilities are. I have contacted the National Fire Academy for Incident Safety Officer training programs, Have the books available mentioned above for self starters, and have researched the Fire Department Safety Officers Association as a tool for supporting interest in and certification of safety officers. This is but one example. I have revised the equipment for a manageable accountability system. Additional portable radios we can issue to mutual aid companies are a priority subject to funding. Not all problems require expensive, high tech solutions. The biggest problem I see for our department is the lack of command staff working days to delegate researching and implementing cost effective solutions to the problems. A common question asked by many is why can't these projects be delegated to the deputy chief's assigned to each shift. The simple answer is the rotating, 24 hour schedule, with time off, and the focus remaining on "running there shifts" does not allow otherwise extremely competent fire officers to get projects done in a timely manner. Let me make it clear, this observation is based on 26 years of trying to delegate projects with limited success. The fault is the schedule and focus not the officers. To date all

attempts to establish command positions working four or five day weeks have failed. While I continue to advocate for fire officers on days, creation of positions, and try to show by delegation examples to the City leadership, the problem is far more complicated than simple more money even if more money existed. A quick story. The City Administration (Mayor's Chief Administrative Officer - CAO and Personnel Director) has restarted meeting with the Deputy Chief's and me. The CAO, after listening to one Deputy Chief bemoan the fact that no one is charged with pursuing grants in the Department, asked the Deputy Chief to take on the grants writing and administration role. This officer respectfully refused the request as not his job and blaming all grant problems on the Chief implying he is not going to clean up the Chief's grants' mess. So much for the \$11,000 grant I just obtained, over \$500,000 in AFG grants we have obtained since 2002, and \$300,000 in building repair bond funding approved. The \$1.39 million in new apparatus and equipment bonding authorized, while the City Council continually say no more bonding, my intent to pursue an AFG grant this coming year and even a fund raising marketing program proposed, does not convince department officers the Chief is not the problem.

**Who conducted and when was the primary search completed (time after arrival)?**

The primary search was conducted by the Rescue 1 crew and Engine 3 crew (from the Bay View Station) from the time of arrival till the evacuation of all fire fighters from the building. The search lasted at least 20 minutes but as reported earlier The primary search of the fifth floor and part of the fourth floor was not completed due to the crew evacuations.

**What problems were encountered during the search?**

The obvious problem was the lack of two member search crews that could be dedicated to the search. Only two crews were actively dedicated to searching five floors with 24 apartments and 1 basement office. The 1900 vintage building, a former hospital converted to apartments, was not modern square or rectangular units. The uniquely configured apartments, the lack of familiarization with the layouts of corridors and units (example, Unit 21, a third floor apartment was only accessible from the fourth floor) and intensifying smoke conditions all were problems. On a positive note, at least six residents were found and either escorted out or directed out as search crews moved on to other units. The rapidly expanding fire, hidden in the expansive balloon frame construction prevented continued searching as a personnel evacuation was ordered.

**Who conducted and when was the secondary search completed?**

As the evacuation of fire fighters was ordered even before the primary search could be completed, no secondary search was under taken as the building rapidly became fully involved.

**What were the results of both the primary and secondary searches?**

As noted above, the primary searches lead to at least 6 residents escorted out or directed to safety outside. Again, there was no secondary search.

**What happened to any victims removed from the occupancy?**

Victims, all of who were mobile, initially lined School Street. I attempted to direct the residents to move inside Fire Headquarters for several reasons. The first was to get the residents evacuated into shelter from the now changing weather (i.e., getting colder quickly) as most were wearing night wear or at most coats and hats. A second reason for moving them into Fire Headquarters was to have them survey who was present and who was not present so we could focus on searches for anyone reported missing. Tenants generally know whether other residents are or may be home or away. They also often know residents are out working or socializing. This information may increase or decrease the urgency of specific apartment searches. Getting tenants all in one place also assists in talking to them. Also, as our social service support partners arrive (example the Red Cross), it provides centralized access to victims

for support, counseling and to begin to arrange more permanent shelter/living quarters. I must admit I was not prepared for two situations as we talked initially with tenants outside. First, the shock of the incident left many less than cooperative as they watched their homes go up in flames. I had to tell a number of tenants multiple times to move inside to help us account for all tenants. The shock and disbelief over what was happening made communicating with the tenant/victims difficult. I did have a problem, which was discussed during your interviews on 11/12/08, in that I wanted the tenants in the upstairs area of Headquarters for warmth, to more easily control them and to keep them from watching the rapid destruction of these homes. I did not assign an officer to handle this and members stopped the tenants moving upstairs until someone could be assigned to stay with them for security of fire fighter belongings in the upstairs area of fire headquarters. This confused tenants even more leading to at least one loud, angry exchange between a tenant and a fire fighter. This incident took days to straighten out the animosity of the tenant who was upset. In the end, the tenant met with several of the members and myself and the air was cleared as to what happened and why. As the issue made newspaper coverage, the tenant and I were happy to clear the air and end the sensational nature of the reporting which was making matters worse for all parties. Eventually, victims were interviewed by the Red Cross or drifted off to friends and family. Those interviewed and tracked by the Red Cross were easily contacted after the fire but those that drifted off to friends and family made finding them difficult. The Mayor's Office, via media announcements for tenants/victims to call in with a contact point, was set up and eventually all tenants locations were known so we could reach them and in some cases arrange interviews as the fire investigation was primarily witness driven.

#### **INCIDENT STABILIZATION**

**When was the incident placed under control.**

The incident was placed under control at approximately 10 AM Saturday, 11/15/08. This action was based on the fire not now being a threat to surrounding occupancies although much overhaul and extinguishment of smoldering rubble, natural gas fed fires burning, and "hot spots" requiring extinguishment had to be done. As noted previously, an entire off duty shift was held over to work the fire, rotate into Fire headquarters for rehab and to eat while on duty personnel rotated from cleanup inside the station to extinguishment work outside while off shift personnel rested and did some work inside.

#### **PROPERTY CONSERVATION**

**What was saved?**

The Lorraine apartments were a total loss with nothing salvageable. The Temple, although completely gutted, had many artifacts and materials such as pray clothes, official documents and books that could be saved. I was reminded early in the day on Saturday that the sacred Torahs had to be found and buried before nightfall and this became a priority goal second only to the search for the fire victim. The Temple Congregation had been offered and was using the Universalist Church one block away on Middle Street for members to pray, mourn their loss, seek solace and offer support. Fire fighters found numerous, wet but relatively useable items such as the original charter for the Temple, and other religious artifacts. It was decided that the items would be collected and almost spontaneously, a group of fire fighters lead by me and the State Fire Marshal walked to the Universalist Church and returned the items in what turned out to be a very emotional exchange of community to community support and appreciation for the care and concern. I must say, there was not a fire fighter who was not touched by the congregations welcome and appreciation as we mingled after a brief presentation. As I/C several strategic goals needed to be completed to allow a safe search for and recovery of the Torahs as well as to prepare for a search of the Lorraine site for the single victim's remains. These goals included arranging for a crane to remove the free standing light/air shaft and elevator shaft. With wind blowing, it was to dangerous to allow personnel within 100 feet of these structures. Both the Torahs and victim's remains were within this

collapse hazard zone. Fortunately the air and light shaft collapsed nearly straight down early in the morning. It took much of the day light hours to arrange for delivery and set up of the crane to knock down the elevator shaft. A decision was made as daylight waned to search for and recover the Torahs before the elevator shaft was knocked down. With the help of Temple members, and an excavator, the back wall of the temple was pulled down towards the parking lot C side allowing ground ladders and fire fighters, after briefing by the Temple staff as to what they were searching for, to enter the area where the Torahs were kept, recover the Torahs, many books and artifacts untouched by fire. Plastic storage bins had been secured from several sources to support this operation always with a watchful eye on the elevator shaft. The remains of the Torahs were given to Temple congregation representatives and this operation was terminated just before dark. This was the most extensive efforts to save materials.

**Were those efforts successful?**

Yes, to the best of everyone's ability.

#### PERSONAL SAFETY

**Identify the members who were injured, the causes of the injuries and their current conditions.** One Beverly Firefighter suffered a shoulder injury in a slip and fall accident as did two Gloucester fire fighters. One of the Gloucester Fire Officer remained on duty and I only became aware of the injury through injury reports reviewed days later. Subsequently, the Fire Officer underwent shoulder surgery and has returned to full duty. A complicating factor was the arrival and declaration by the a representative from the Department of Environmental Protection that the site was contaminated by asbestos. This official announced that both sites were suspected to contain asbestos and thus were contaminated. Based on my knowledge of asbestos, the extremely wet conditions and smoke plume that rose quickly all night, I did not believe the exposure hazard to fire fighters was a major concern. However, as concerns for exposure were raised, fire fighters were encouraged to complete injury reports. Our injury reports are detailed and contain provisions for identifying exposure to hazardous substances. I finally had to resort to a spread sheet to track the injury reports and exposure reports which were all filed as required by City and Department policy (i.e., a copy to the member's Department personnel file a copy to the City Personnel Department, and a copy to the Gloucester Contributory Retirement Board as required under a specific State statute). In addition to the two slip/fall injuries, fifty injury reports for possible asbestos exposure were filed.

**Identify any situations that posed an extraordinary risk to personnel safety.**

Inadequate staffing, especially recognizing one EMS response was on going and the first due pump was returning from another medical emergency, created an extraordinary risk to the first arriving fire fighters. The interior search and rescue efforts, interior fire fighting effort, communication of the evacuation signals via radio and air horn activations which were allegedly not heard, all created extraordinary risks in a building that was being engulfed in flames hidden by balloon construction. I had a chance meeting with a former resident on 1/1/08. The former resident reported a water leak in her apartment ceiling that required the ceiling to be partially removed to access the leaking pipe. She reported that to the plumbers and her surprise there was a huge void space above the ceiling and she described plastic bags of what appeared to be demolition materials hanging in the void space apparently left there from prior renovations. This description and the fact that smoke was relatively light during the initial 10 to 20 minutes of the fire indicated to me the balloon construction acted as a smoke and heat "sink" that was not readily apparent even to those inside the building until fire began to break out into rooms, corridors and stairwells. This created an extreme risk to personnel. The collapse hazard of walls created extraordinary risks as did the electric lines and transformers spun and launched off poles, caused by collapsing walls, all created extraordinary risk. There is also the recognized risk of the force of heavy stream appliances hitting members. The rapidly falling temperatures causing ice as well as cold injuries were also risks to personnel safety. Having seen a ladder pipe release from a ladder tip and swing wildly

at a church fire years ago, as well as the potential of burst hose lines and deluge guns not properly secured sliding around uncontrolled also are risks of a fire of this magnitude. While I'd prefer no injuries, I believe the operations were conducted as safely as possible without an incident safety officer.

**What were the safety issues at the incident.**

See all the narrative points on safety in preceding answers.

**Outside Agencies:**

**What agencies were requested and responded?**

1. Verizon telephone company
2. National grid
  - A. Electric power utility
  - B. Gas utility
3. Red Cross
4. Building owners and/or representatives
5. Rehab Five (private volunteer) unit
6. State Department of Environmental Protection
7. Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
  - A. Area Director
  - B. Public assistance specialist
8. Mutual aid
  1. Nineteen engine companies from eighteen communities
  2. Six ladder companies each from a different community
9. Gloucester Department of Public works
  - A. Highway Division for sand and salt
  - B. Water Division as a liaison to the water pumping stations and to support water supply decisions
10. Gloucester Police
  - A. On duty and call back personnel
  - B. Auxiliary police
11. Mayor's office (Mayor Bell)
12. City Councilors (three)
13. Fire Marshal and resources
  - A. Fire investigators
  - B. Incident support command van and staff
  - C. Rehab van and staff
  - D. State Police helicopter
  - E. Support staff (ex. Tents for meetings/security)
14. State Executive Office of Public Safety (Under Secretary Kurt Schwartz)
15. Medical Examiner's office
16. Federal Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Department
17. District Attorney's Office.
18. The media
  - A. Print media
  - B. TV media
19. Numerous volunteers offering assistance
20. Urban Search and Rescue Team members and resources (ex. Trailered lighting towers).
21. Cape Ann Transportation Authority

While many of these agencies were requested, my experience is that some self dispatch. The problem is not enough resources but getting the right mix at the right time. While a liaison position in the command staff to responders, both requested and self dispatched, would have helped, my experience over 26 years

is that these many of these people are as much front row spectators as active support staff. They often cannot be used and often disappear even when asked to stay in a certain area.

**Did they meet the needs of the Department?**

Yes not withstanding the difficult discussions of who would pay for what in the three weeks following the fire.

**What assistance did they provide?**

The assistance ranged from obtaining breakfast type food for crews in the early morning hours of Saturday 11/15/08 to canister filter type respiratory protection and fit testing during the search phase. Sifting tables were built at the Fire Academy and written action planning as well as logistic support was provided. Again, the finance issues were the most perplexing and I doubt a finance section would have solved the problem. I was scheduled to attend IS-400 training in the week after the fire and I did as I needed to complete this credential/experience. As we worked through the course, I was vocal about the "ideal" perception that money is no object during emergencies and disasters. The tabletop exercises are all run as if money is unlimited. My contribution to the class was that money is and always will be an problem as local communities struggle under tax limiting legislation (Prop 2.5) and now the international economic recession (close to depression) we are facing are all constraining funding.

**How can the agency better assist the department in the future?**


This question is in the singular form when in fact more than 20 agencies were involved. My experience is that most agencies truly want to help. I am convinced, that unless all agencies are trained in NIMS and Incident Command, we will continue to struggle with a unified command. As an example, despite training, and my request that the police sergeant assigned as police commander stay at or near the command post, I had to chase him down on a number of occasions to get actions accomplished. The push down of NIMS and Incident unified command operations will, I suspect, be ongoing long after I leave the fire service. Until then, I will work with anyone to attempt to push down the concepts and demand that agencies operate under the I/C system.

**Recommendations for improvement:**

Primary Areas for Improvement

1. Need to establish and "grow" the incident command system command and control staff as well as sector officers at major events, especially those that span more than one day.
2. Specific command and control positions that need to be filled as quickly as possible, like with the staging officer and location, include safety officer , operations officer, water supply officer, public information officer, liaison officer, and sector officers. In the final analysis, this incident could have used the formation of a command staff, an operations section, logistics section, finance section and intelligence to coordinate all the funotions that were being performed but without the "meeting of the minds" and coordination of services/operations that the Incident Command System (ICS) is intended to provide.
3. Radio communications to all command staff, sectors and companies needs to be available.
4. Rotation of crews of personnel to allow a break and rehabilitation of all on scene responders. I was indirectly made aware of the number of Gloucester Fire Fighters who had a lot of down time in and around the Fire Station while mutual aid companies were not relieved for rehab unless they arranged it themselves. This area of improvement struck me and will be a focus for me in the future.

5. The need to assure that when emergency procurements for heavy equipment (ex. excavators) or specialized equipment (ex. portable heaters) to thaw apparatus so as to prevent damage are needed, they are available and most importantly paid for their services/equipment in a timely manner.
6. Need to recognize the interruption of utility services due to the fire and Lorraine building collapse. In effect Fire Headquarters lost telephone, radio communications and fire alarm utilities. To their credit the dispatch staff did a remarkable job of setting up alternative forms of telecommunications and radio communications to support this incident and respond to other emergencies as they occurred.
7. A broad, serious review of the responsibility for victim recovery, who is the authority having jurisdiction, and most importantly who will pay the costs for this critical response operation. These issues raised challenges for all the responders who were acting in good faith with limited resources.
8. Need for more definitive information to responders regarding the actual exposure levels to hazardous materials, such as asbestos, once an agency with responsibility for protection of everyone from these materials determines the materials exist in at the scene of a fire.



File = Lorraine Org Chart/lwp

<b>GLOUCESTER FIRE DEPARTMENT</b>	<b>CHAPTER:</b>	V	Command Operations				
<b>OPERATIONS MANUAL BOOK 3</b>	<b>SUBJECT:</b>	1	Incident Command System				
<b>EMERGENCY OPERATIONS</b>	<b>CODE:</b>	3-V-1	<b>PAGE</b>	4	<b>OF</b>	10	<b>DATE:</b> 03/09/2000

H. Manage resources.

1. Deployment of resources must be continually evaluated and adjusted.
2. If you have just enough resources to get the job done, it is time to order additional companies/resources.

I. Coordination of overall emergency activities

1. The IC must monitor operations to ensure the proper coordination of resources.
2. The goal of the IC is to obtain maximum productivity from all resources.

J. Provide progress reports in a timely manner.

K. Provide for continuity, transfer and termination of command.

1.05 Standard Geographic Designation System

A. Each exterior side of a structure shall be given an alphabetic designation for identification purposes.

1. The street side of the structure (address side) shall be known as side "A".
  - a. If it is more practical, due to response location, a different side may be designated as "side A", but this information must be relayed to all personnel.
2. Remaining sides shall be designated as sides "B", "C", and "D" moving in a clockwise rotation starting from side "A".

B. Exposures shall be designated in a like manner.

1. The exposure on side A shall be known as "exposure A", the exposure on side B shall be known as "exposure B" etc.

C. Interior floors of a building shall be designated by floor (e.g. 1,2,3 etc.)

1. The basement, attic and roof shall be designated by name.

1.06 Transfer of Command

A. The arrival of a higher ranking Officer does not mean the command is automatically transferred. Command is transferred when the following functions have been completed.

1. If command has been established by a firefighter, command shall be transferred to the first arriving Officer.
2. The first arriving Officer will communicate to the initial IC being relieved either face-to-face or via radio that he is taking over Command
3. The Officer being relieved will brief the Officer assuming Command on the incident extent and conditions, control efforts under way, units deployed and any other pertinent information.

GLOUCESTER FIRE DEPARTMENT	CHAPTER:	V	Command Operations					
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS	CODE:	3-V-1	PAGE	5	OF	10	DATE:	10/11/95

4. The first arriving Officer will communicate to Headquarters that he is taking Command.
5. Command shall be transferred to the first arriving Chief Officer at the Chief Officer's discretion.
  - a. The Chief Officer may choose to allow the company/first arriving Officer to retain IC and the Chief Officer assumes an advisory role, command position or functional role (ex. Fire Investigator).
  - b. Transfer of incident command to higher Officers is also discretionary.

#### 1.07 Staging

- A. Level one staging
  - a. Used to control the first alarm assignment.
  - b. In the fast attack mode, first arriving companies will position themselves and conduct operations per Standard Operating Procedures.
  - c. In the investigation mode, the first arriving engine company will proceed with the investigation. All other apparatus shall take up normal positions and stay with their machines to await orders from the Incident Commander.
  - d. Second and subsequent arriving companies shall stage one block from the scene, announce their position and await orders from the Incident Commander.
- B. Level two staging
  - a. Level two staging location shall be designated by the Incident Commander.
  - b. Level two staging is a location for all second or greater alarm or mutual aid companies to report.
  - c. Level two staging should be located at a site that will not interfere with incident operations.
  - d. The Staging Officer will have the following responsibilities.
    1. Communicates directly with the IC and assigns companies as requested by Command.
    2. Maintains a log of apparatus assigned to staging area
    3. Makes assignments to units verbally and not by radio.
    4. Maintains warning lights only on the vehicle he is assigned to.
    5. Periodically reports resource availability to Command.
    6. Coordinate with police to block streets and control traffic to the staging area.
    7. Maintain a conspicuous location.

# ***APPENDIX D***

# ***STATE FIRE MARSHAL FINAL REPORT***



**Municipal  
Resources  
Inc.**



**Municipal  
Resources**

# State Fire Marshal – Final Report

For Immediate Release: January 11, 2007



DEVAL L. PATRICK  
GOVERNOR

TIMOTHY P. MURRAY  
LT. GOVERNOR

KEVIN M. BUJUCE  
SECRETARY

## The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security Department of Fire Services



STEPHEN D. CORN  
STATE FIRE MARSHAL

THOMAS P. LEONARD  
DEPUTY STATE FIRE MARSHAL

Contact: Jennifer Mieth, (978) 567-3381

### Gloucester Fatal Fire Investigation Concludes

State Fire Marshal Stephen D. Coan Gloucester Fire Chief Barry S. McKay and Gloucester Police Chief John Beaudette have concluded their joint investigation in the fatal fire at 80 Middle Street on December 14, 2007 and determined the fire was not intentionally set.

#### Area of Origin

Investigators have determined that in all probability, the fire began in the basement in an area near the center of the building. Due to the destruction it is impossible to determine with greater specificity if the area of origin. The fire's origin in that particular area greatly contributed to the quick progression and spread of the fire to other floors within the building.

#### Unintentional Cause

Due to the complete destruction of the building, the exact cause of this fire is undetermined. Several possible unintentional (accidental) sources of ignition were identified (such as electrical malfunction, human carelessness, etc.) but cannot be independently corroborated due to the damage to the building. Nonetheless, investigators have not found any information or evidence that this fire was either a criminal act or was intentionally set.

Coan said, "Some of the possible ignition scenarios identified by investigators were: improper disposal of smoking materials in either the furnace room or apartment A, an electric lamp igniting a couch, other combustibles too close to the lamp, or a mechanical or electrical malfunction. There is insufficient evidence to render one scenario as the most probable."

Chief McKay said, "This fire was a terrible tragedy for the residents of 80 Middle Street, the worshipers of the Ahavat Achim Temple, the citizens of Gloucester, the firefighters of Gloucester and the city as a whole." He added, "We especially mourn the loss of Mr. Taylor who was known and liked by so many in our community."

Within hours of the original call, all known occupants of 80 Middle Street were safe and accounted for except for a third floor occupant, Robert Taylor (70 years of age). Although a positive identification of Mr. Taylor has yet to be established, investigators, using hand tools and hand sifting operations in conjunction with heavy equipment, have recovered portions of human remains, which in all likelihood, belong to Mr. Taylor.

The building at 80 Middle Street was a four story, wood framed structure that contained 24 apartments and one office suite. Approximately twenty-five people inhabited this building. In total, eight alarms were struck for this fire. Despite fire suppression activities, the fire quickly spread throughout the building and extended to the Ahavath Achim Temple, located at 86 Middle Street. Both buildings suffered irreversible damage and were completely destroyed as a result of the fire. Suppression operations continued until December 19, 2007.

From December 19, 2007 through December 29, 2007, representatives and investigators from the City of Gloucester Fire and Police Departments, the Executive Office of Public Safety & Security, the Essex District Attorney's Office, the Medical Examiner's Office, the Special Operations and Hazardous Materials Divisions within the Department of Fire Services, the federal Urban Search and Rescue Region I team, the Mass. Department of Environmental Protection and State Police assigned to the Office of the State Fire Marshal, Crime Scene Services Section and K-9 units were deployed to this location in attempts to retrieve the remains of Mr. Taylor and to further the cause and origin investigation of this fire. Investigators were greatly assisted by the City of Gloucester and Rockport's Department's of Public Works and by Tally's, Inc., who donated manpower and equipment to the recovery and examination efforts. These recovery and investigative endeavors were periodically interrupted due to structural hazards, snow, below freezing temperatures, and high concentrations of asbestos found to be located inside of 80 Middle Street.

Administrative Services Hazardous Materials Response  
Massachusetts Firefighting Academy t Office of the State  
Fire  
Marshal

# ***APPENDIX E***

# ***GLOUCESTER HEALTH DEPARTMENT'S REPORT***



**Municipal  
Resources  
Inc.**



**Municipal  
Resources**

## Report from Gloucester Health Department

**Strength:** On balance I think all sectors of the City, both formal city structures and citizens were most **responsive, helpful and carried out the majority of their duties quite effectively.** Despite not always having clearly defined channels of communication, a great deal of information was shared and acted upon in a timely manner resulting in a reasonably well coordinated response.

Without the designation of clear cut "chiefs" in key sectors, most **coordination tasks fell to the Office of the Mayor, an unrelenting responsibility, which they carried out extraordinarily well and with patience, grace, and empathy.**

On the other hand, there were also times when "who was responsible for what" and "who was doing what" (meaning two distinct things) was not always clear. **Thus I note the following Areas for Improvement:**

1. One of the related issues is whether a real Incident Command System (ICS) was ever used. I was never aware of, or informed that, formal ICS was in use, as I believe it ought to have been. Consequently there were never formal roles designated. Formal goals and objectives for each time block were never written and communicated. To the best of my knowledge, an Incident Commander (nor any other major official role within ICS) for each time block was not designated. Therefore it is not possible to respond to the goals and objectives related section of the after action report.

Recommendation: We are all trying to learn and use the ICS system. It would behoove us, I would think, to use it every time we face any emergency in the city.

2. The Health Department did not receive any formal notification of the fire: not even informally — "just to let us know"- ; not because human health and safety were threatened; and not because there might have been a potential environmental hazard created by virtue of the materials that were burning. The Health Director was not notified of the Lorraine fire, even though 2 weeks prior, he was called at 2:00 AM on a Saturday night and notified about the fire at Charlie's Restaurant.

(When the PHN arose on Saturday morning she learned about the fire via the media, called the Fire Dept. to learn if a shelter was open, and proceeded to the shelter to assess the situation. At that location the PHN learned from the Red Cross about the 10 AM briefing to take place at City Hall and proceeded to that venue, contributing an update from the shelter and participating in the

informing, consoling, and informal counseling provided to residents of the Lorraine Apts. as they came to City Hall to ask about the presence of other residents of the building. After this meeting the PHN called and spoke to the Health Director at length indicating that there seemed no immediate need of the health department's participation; the situation was well in hand via the Fire and Police Departments and the Am. Red Cross in terms of emergency services to burned out residents. This may not have been a fully accurate assessment related to the absence of discussion of potentially hazardous materials that had burned/were burning and an appropriate discernment of whether there was any environmental concern that ought to be further explored.)

### **Recommendations:**

- A. I believe it remains a communications issue that we in Gloucester ought to assure gets addressed: The Health Department (GHD) via the Health Director or his designee, ought to be informed of any and all emergencies that have even the potential to impact human and or/environmental health. In some cases there will be no need of the participation of the GHD; in others there will be and the director should deploy assets as appropriate. And, as in the Lorraine Fire, there may be very useful things about which the GHD can offer assistance, that might not immediately come to the minds of other (police/fire) First Responders, who are correctly focused on the fire and fire related safety as their first priority.
- B. It would behoove the City, I believe, to designate one or a small number of the city's own social service providers to represent the City in coordination of social services and "bridging" between the City and the Am. Red Cross (ARC), which quite appropriately will always be the first line of emergency response to victims of "natural" disasters. Using an ICS structure with an "Operations" section to cover these areas of need might be one way to go about it. The ARC, and then MEMA, with no other direction, repeatedly turned to the Office of the Mayor to address social service and claims concerns and coordination. In even such a small scale disaster as the Lorraine Fire, the Office of the Mayor might well be relieved of this task and it shifted to others in the City's structure with social service experience: e.g. staff of the Council on Aging, staff of the Veteran's Center; the PHN, the newly designated administrative assistant coordinating the human service related city services, the CDBG Director, etc.
- C. Related to this concern is the need to have structures and clarity of communications about who will coordinate social services to the victims once the emergency phase of the disaster is over, and the ARC is ready to start withdrawing, and victims, now assisted, are ready to move on.

In the situation of the Lorraine Fire many segments of our wonderful community came forward to assist: The Gloucester Fund to coordinate financial assistance; the Open Door Food Pantry to coordinate emergency food and gift cards; the Rotary to coordinate household goods distribution; Action, Inc. to coordinate clothing donations and also to assist with locating local alternative housing and to coordinate communications to the residents, and Councilor Jackie Hardy, who with a group of volunteers provided a great deal of assistance with clothing and household goods distribution. Again with no social service coordinator designated on behalf of the City, the Office of the Mayor was often swamped with trying to coordinate these responses but, never-the-less, managed to do an extraordinarily good job. Both the Mayor and his Administrative Assistance, Chris Pantano were unending in their support of recovery issues and assisting with coordination. Somehow those of us working behind the scenes all managed to catch up with each other reasonably well and make it work. I believe the leadership that Action, Inc. readily offered and the coordinating role that they assumed was critical to making it all work out as best as possible. But it could have been much smoother. It might all have worked even more smoothly with clearer designation of persons outside the Mayor's Office assigned to coordinate these areas. And there may well have been other key players doing their part of whom I am unaware because of the lack of designated coordinators.

D. Recovery phase: Behavioral Health Issues.

Similarly I believe the designation of someone to identify and coordinate the performance of activities related to behavioral health concerns in a recovery phase would be beneficial. The needs noted above at "C" also relate to this area. In the specifics of the Lorraine Fire, it was noted in conversations between police and health department staff and other social service providers in the city, that a nondenominational healing service might be very beneficial first and foremost to the persons made homeless by the fire and to the safety personnel who fought the fire, as well as to the city in general. With no one designated as responsible for such recovery or behavioral health issues, a small group took it upon themselves to try to think through and offer such a service. Mobilized and responsive were the PHN, Claudia Schweitzer and Sandy Dahl Ronan, who coordinate behavioral health emergency response for the GHD, Rabbi Samuel Barth , Rev.'s Dick Simeone and Lyn Brakeman of St. John's Episcopal Church (who in turn liaised with the Pastor of Trinity.) Once again the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor himself, and the Police and Fire Departments were all very responsive and helped this important community event go well.

E. Media/Public Information: Again, similarly, the designation day by day of a Public Information Officer would have been beneficial. Again, this could have reduced the pressure on the Office of the Mayor and could have assisted the dissemination of information to all who needed it in the area.